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ABSTRACT
A collective obligation is an obligation directed to a group
of agents so that the group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve
a given task. The problem investigated here is the impact
of collective obligations on individual obligations, i.e. obli-
gations directed to single agents of the group. In this case,
we claim that the derivation of individual obligations from
collective obligations depends on several parameters among
which the ability of the agents (i.e. what they can do) and
their own personal commitments (i.e. what they are de-
termined to do). As for checking if these obligations are
fulfilled or not, we need to know what are the actual actions
performed by the agents.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic]: Modal Logic; I.2.4 [Knowledge
Representation Formalisms and Methods]: Modal Logic;
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent
Systems
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
modal logic, deontic logic, multiagent systems
1. INTRODUCTION
This poster studies the relation between collective obliga-
tions directed to a group of agents and the individual obli-
gations directed to the single agents of the group. We study
this relation in the case when the group of agents is not
structured by any hierarchical structure and has no repre-
sentative agent. Notice that this work has been partially
studied in [2].
A collective obligation addressed to a group of agents is
such that this group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve a
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given task. This comes to say that a given task is assigned
as a goal to the group as a whole. For instance, (cf. [3]),
when a mother says: “Boys, you have to set the table”, she
defines an obligation aimed at the group of her boys. The
goal assigned to the boys is to set the table and the mother
expects that the table will be set by some actions performed
by her boys. Whether only one of her boys or all of them
will bring it about that the table is set is not specified by
the mother.
Understanding how the collective obligations are trans-
lated into individual obligations is the problem which is in-
vestigated here. We claim that the derivation of individual
obligations from collective obligations depends on several
parameters among which the ability of the agents and their
own personal commitments. Latter on, by examining the
actual actions of each agent of the group, one can check if
these obligations are satisfied or violated.
2. COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS
This poster addresses the question of the translation of a
collective obligation into individual obligations in the rather
general case when the collective obligations are conditional
ones. We use Boutilier’s ideality operator I(−|−) [1] to ex-
press such obligations. For instance, I(s|d) means “if there
is a dog, then it there should be a signal”.
We consider a finite set of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}. In
the following, we suppose that Σ is a set of conditional pref-
erences expressing the obligations directed to A.
Starting from Boutilier’s work, as we have shown in [2],
in order to derive obligations we need to consider what the
agents can do and cannot do. For representing ability, we
partition for each agent ai the atoms into two classes : Cai
which represents the atoms the agent can change the truth
value of and Cai which represents the atoms the agent can
change the truth value of. From this partition, we can build
the set of atoms controllable by A : C =  ai∈A Cai . We
then extend this notion to propositions following Boutilier.
Given a knowledge base KB (a set of propositional formu-
las which represents the common beliefs of the agents about
the world), we can define UI(KB) : UI(KB) is the set of
formulas which are true in the world and whose truth value
cannot be changed by the group of agents.
From those definitions, we can derive the group’s obliga-
tions :
Definition 1. The group A has the obligation of ϕ
toward the agent who directed the collective obliga-
tion iff Σ |= I(ϕ|UI(KB)) with ϕ controllable by A. This
is noted OAφ.
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The group’s obligation are derived from the conditional
obligations Σ directed to the group given what is fixed (rep-
resented by UI(KB)) and given what the group controls.
We can go further and direct those obligations to the sub-
groups that can really fulfil them :
Definition 2. Let φ be a proposition. Let Aφ be the union
of the minimal subsets of A that control φ. We say that the
sub-group Aφ has the obligation of φ, toward A iff
Σ |= I(φ|UI(KB)) . It is denoted by OAAφφ.
Example 1. Let us consider a group A of three agents
named Alice (denoted by A), John (denoted by J) and Tom
(denoted by T ). That group is addressed the following obli-
gations: “if the statistics are collected (s), then the financial
proposal (fp) and the scientific proposal (sp) should be writ-
ten” and “if the statistics are not collected, then the financial
proposal should not be written, but the scientifically proposal
should be”. This scenario is translated into the following set
of formulas: {I(fp ∧ sp|s), I(¬fp ∧ sp|¬s)}.
Let us suppose that KB = {s,¬fp,¬sp}. Let us also
suppose that CA = CT = {fp} and that CJ = {sp}. So A
controls both fp and sp.
In this case, UI(KB) = {s} and A has the obligation of
fp ∧ sp, thus A has the obligation of fp and the obligation
of sp. Moreover, as fp is controllable by both Alice and
Tom, then {A, T} has the obligation toward A to achieve
fp. Finally, as John is the only agent which controls sp,
{J} has the obligation toward A to achieve sp.
3. INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS
In order to derive individual obligations, we think that we
have to consider each agent’s commitments. Given an atom
it controls, an agent may have three positions, represented
by three sets. Com+,ai ⊆ Cai is the set of atoms ai controls
such that ai commits itself to make them true. Com−,ai ⊆
Cai is the set of atoms ai controls such that ai commits itself
not to make them true. Pai = Cai \ (Com+,ai ∪ Com−,ai)
is the set of atoms ai controls such that ai does not commit
to make them true nor commits not to make them true.
We impose some consistency constraints on those sets (not
detailed here). For instance, an agent cannot commit itself
to make an atom true and to make it not true.
We can now now characterise the obligations that are di-
rected to some agents of the group, given the obligations of
the group and given the agent’s commitments. Individual
obligations are defined by:
Definition 3. Let φ be a proposition such that OAφ holds.
Let ai be an agent ofA. If there is some minimal {l1, . . . , lm} ⊆
Com+,ai such that |= l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm → φ, we say that ai is
obligated to satisfy l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm toward Aφ. This is
denoted by O
Aφ
ai (l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm).
For checking if the different obligations introduced previ-
ously are violated or not, we must examine the results of the
agents’ actions. Let KBn be the state of the world resulting
from the actions of the agents and let φ be such that OAφ.
• if KBn |= φ then the collective obligation is not vio-
lated. We say that the collective obligation is fulfilled.
• if KBn |= φ then OA(φ) is violated. The whole group
A is taken as responsible for the violation, by the agent
who directed the collective obligation. We consider
Aφ. Thus, since KBn |= φ, OAAφ (φ) is violated too andAφ is taken as responsible, by A, for this violation.
• let us consider all the agents ai such that there is
some ϕ such that O
Aφ
ai (ϕ). If KBn |= ϕ, the obli-
gation O
Aφ
ai (ϕ) is violated too and ai can be taken as
responsible by Aφ of the violation of its commitment
i.e. O
Aφ
ai ϕ. Moreover, if KBn |= φ, ai can be taken by
Aφ responsible for the violation of OAAφ (φ).
Example 2. (ex. 1 continuing) Let us suppose that Al-
ice commits herself to write the financial proposal. In this
case, Com+,A = {fp} and we can derive O{A,T}A (fp) (be-
cause OA(fp) holds). Alice is obligated to achieve fp toward
{A, T}.
Assume that Alice writes the financial proposal, that John
writes the scientific proposal and that Tom does nothing. In
this case, KBnext = {s, sp, fp} and all the obligations are
fulfilled.
Assume now that Alice does not write the financial pro-
posal, but that Tom writes the financial proposal. Assume
also that John writes the scientific proposal. In this case, the
collective obligation OA(fp ∧ sp) is satisfied, OA{A,T}(fp) is
satisfied too, but O
{A,T}
A (fp) is violated. Even if the group
fulfilled its obligations, the obligation of Alice toward {A, T}
to achieve fp is violated.
4. CONCLUSION
In this poster, we have presented a preliminary work about
collective obligations, i.e. obligations directed to a group of
agents. The first step was to determine the obligations of
the group, given what is fixed in the world and given what
this group as a whole, can do. Then we considered that, if
the group is obliged to make A true, then it induces another
obligation to the very sub-group who control A: that sub-
group is obliged, toward the whole group, to make A true.
These definitions of obligation are direct extensions, to the
multi-agent case, of one definition provided by Boutilier in
the single-agent case.
As for individual obligations, they are induced as soon
as an agent commits itself to satisfy, by one of its action,
an obligation of the group. Checking if these obligations
are violated or not need to consider the state of the world
obtained after the agents’ actual actions.
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